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New stockpiles of smallpox vaccine are required as a contingency for protect-
ing civilian and military personnel against deliberate dissemination of smallpox
virus by terrorists or unfriendly governments. The smallpox vaccine in the cur-
rent stockpile consists of a live animal poxvirus (Vaccinia virus [VACV]) that
was grown on the skin of calves. Because of potential issues with controlling
this earlier manufacturing process, which included scraping VACV lesions from
calfskin, new vaccines are being developed and manufactured by using viral
propagation on well-characterized cell substrates. We describe, from a regula-
tory perspective, the various strains of VACV, the adverse events associated
with calf lymph-propagated smallpox vaccine, the issues regarding selection
and use of cell substrates for vaccine production, and the issues involved in
demonstrating evidence of safety and efficacy.
An attack on the United States with a biological or
chemical weapon is an eventuality that must be actively
addressed (1,2). Civilian and military public health agencies
are preparing to cope with biological terrorism and warfare
through efforts to stockpile vaccines and antibiotics needed
to protect against diseases caused by potential biological
weapons. New vaccines, such as a new smallpox vaccine, are
being actively developed, and other biologics are needed to
counteract the effects of these weapons on the domestic pop-
ulation and military forces.
Smallpox ( Variola major) is a particularly dangerous
biological weapon threat because of its clinical and epidemio-
logic properties (2,3). This virus can be manufactured in
large quantities, stored for an extended period of time, and
delivered as an infectious aerosol. Evidence indicating that
potential enemies of the United States possess smallpox
virus has led to concerns about the susceptibility of U.S.
troops and civilians to the virus and the need to develop
defense strategies (4). With the success of the World Health
Organization (WHO) campaign in the 1970s to eradicate nat-
urally occurring smallpox and the subsequent discontinua-
tion of vaccination, a large proportion of the population has
no immunity. Case-fatality rates could be higher than 25% if
smallpox were released as a bioterrorist weapon (5). 
The U.S. stockpile of smallpox vaccine is maintained by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
These decades-old doses may be inadequate to meet the vac-
cination needs projected after a bioweapon incident. The
number of doses needed in various scenarios has recently
been discussed (6). In 1972, for example, a single case of
smallpox in Yugoslavia required 18 million doses of vaccine
to stop the spread of disease (7). At least 40 million doses of
vaccine are projected to be needed to respond effectively to a
terrorist attack in the United States (6).
Smallpox Vaccine
The only commercially approved smallpox vaccine avail-
able for limited use in the United States is Wyeth Dryvax.
This vaccine is a lyophilized preparation of live  Vaccinia
virus (VACV), made by using strain New York City calf
lymph (NYC_CL), derived from a seed virus of the New York
City Board of Health (NYCBH) strain of VACV that under-
went 22 to 28 heifer passages. The vaccine consists of lyo-
philized calf lymph containing VACV prepared from live
calves. The animals were infected by scarification, and the
skin containing viral lesions was physically removed by
scraping. The lyophilized calf lymph type vaccine is reconsti-
tuted with a diluent containing 50% glycerin, 0.25% phenol,
and 0.005% brilliant green. Vaccine prepared by this tradi-
tional manufacturing technique of harvesting VACV from
the skin of cows (and sheep) was used in most regions of the
world during the smallpox eradication campaign. The facili-
ties, expertise, and infrastructure required for producing the
virus in this way are no longer available. Wyeth Laborato-
ries discontinued distribution of smallpox vaccine to civilians
in 1983(8). 
This live-virus vaccine also caused rare but serious
adverse reactions and common local reactions. Effective vac-
cination, classified as a “take,” was indicated by the observa-
tion of a pustular lesion 6 to 10 days after vaccination at the
injection site. This lesion represented a localized infection
and was associated with the generation of an immune
response. The vaccine take rate has been generally accepted
as a correlate of vaccine efficacy. Specifically, there is a
direct relationship between the intensity and extent of virus
multiplication and the magnitude and duration of antibody
response (9-13). The vaccine take rate of lesion formation for
the currently stockpiled vaccine is >90%. Intradermal and
intramuscular administration of VACV vaccine produces
less severe local reactions, thus decreasing the risk of inad-
vertent autoinoculation or transmission; however, this inoc-
ulation route produces substantially lower responses as
measured by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)
and neutralizing antibody testing (9,13). 
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Adverse Events Associated with VACV Vaccine
The complications arising from smallpox vaccination
were well documented during the vaccination program (14-
20). Dermatologic and central nervous system disorders
were the most frequently recognized adverse events. Dermal
complications included vaccinia necrosum, a complication
with case-fatality rates of 75% to 100% that occurred almost
exclusively in persons with cellular immunodeficiency (21).
Eczema vaccinatum was associated with case-fatality rates
of up to 10% overall and 30% to 40% in children <2 years of
age (22). Generalized vaccinia was reported and probably
resulted from rare bloodborne dissemination of virus in nor-
mal persons. Erythematous urticarial eruptions occurred in
1% of all primary vaccinees, and rarely, Stevens-Johnson
syndrome occurred. Rarer diseases such as pericarditis (23),
arthritis (24), and malignant tumors at vaccination scars
(25) have been described in case reports.
During the U.S. smallpox vaccination program, approxi-
mately seven to nine deaths per year were attributed to vac-
cination, with the highest risk for death in infants. Most of
these infant deaths were attributed to postvaccinal encepha-
litis (26). Most primary vaccinations in the United States
were administered to children, so less is known about
adverse events in adults. Rates tended to be higher in pri-
mary vaccinees and also in certain countries such as Austria
and Denmark, where strains were used that may have been
more virulent.
Of important concern is inadvertent administration of
vaccine to persons who are immunodeficient or have other
underlying contraindications to VACV vaccination, such as
pregnancy. Administration of vaccine in the context of mass
vaccination for outbreak control increases the risk for seri-
ous adverse events, since careful screening for vaccine con-
traindications would be problematic. Cultures of the
vaccination sites of primary vaccinees have yielded positive
cultures from days 3 through 14 after vaccination. Thus,
transmission of VACV to close contacts of vaccine recipients
does occur (27-30) and, in light of the global HIV epidemic
and the large prevalence of patients on immunosuppressive
therapy, constitutes a serious concern (31). 
Development of New VACV Vaccines
During the early eradication campaign, a number of
studies were undertaken to determine the factors that ren-
dered the smallpox vaccine potent and stable. WHO and its
Expert Committee provided the initial recommendations for
smallpox vaccines in 1959 and updated them in 1965, defin-
ing testing procedures and standards, including a required
pock count of 1 x 108 PFU/mL of undiluted vaccine (32). In
1967, the National Institutes of Health published more
stringent requirements, including the use of a national
reference vaccine preparation.
Selection of Strain
The smallpox eradication campaign used vaccines
derived from many VACV strains. In the United States,
these included the New York City calf lymph (NYC_CL) and
New York City chorioallantoic membrane (NYC_CAM)
strains, both of which were derived from a seed virus of the
NYCBH strain. Strains derived from the NYCBH strain
caused lower rates of adverse events, especially encephalitis.
Other strains used frequently in the global eradication
program were EM-63 (USSR) and Temple of Heaven
(China). The Lister or Elestree (United Kingdom) strain,
prepared on the skin of sheep, was used extensively in
Europe and other parts of the world. The Lister strain,
which appeared to cause less illness than some of the other
vaccine strains, was distributed by the WHO International
Reference Centre to production laboratories for use as seed
lots. By 1968, 71 producers used 15 principal strains of
VACV, in addition to some unknown strains. From 1968 to
1971, the Lister strain became the most widely used
throughout the world (33). 
The exact origin and lineage of many of these strains
and their relation to each other are not clear; however, all
these strains (that were used in settings where smallpox
actually occurred) were effective in eliminating the disease.
With regard to efficacy, this observation suggests a degree of
latitude in the selection of a VACV strain to provide protec-
tive immunity. From a scientific and regulatory perspective,
many strains of VACV should be appropriate for a new vac-
cine as long as the manufacturer can demonstrate that the
new vaccine is safe and elicits a “take” and an immune
response analogous to that observed for the present licensed
vaccine.
Selection of Cell Substrate
Historically, most manufacturers produced smallpox
vaccine in live animals. However, this harvesting method
has important limitations: it is prone to contamination with
bacteria and other adventitious agents, and the antigenic
and allergenic character of the accompanying animal protein
can potentially result in sensitization and allergic reactions.
Thus, the use of a well-characterized cell substrate for vac-
cine production has some potential advantages. The Ortho-
poxviridae, including Vaccinia, generally replicate on a wide
range of candidate vertebrate fibroblast cell lines. The choice
of a well-characterized or easily tested cell substrate for vac-
cine production can help expedite the review process (34).
Issues associated with cell substrates that have been used
for the manufacture of licensed live-virus vaccines may be
the easiest to anticipate and address.
Use of primary cell substrates, particularly embryo-
nated chicken egg-produced smallpox vaccine, would help to
address major issues with regard to preparation of vaccine in
cell culture. Cells derived from embryonated chicken eggs
(especially chicken embryo fibroblasts) have been used in
preparing many safe biological products, including vaccines.
A variety of methods to ensure product safety can be evalu-
ated rapidly with a high degree of confidence.
Candidate cell substrates for a new smallpox vaccine
also include continuous cell lines or diploid cell strains of
human or animal origin. For human cell substrates, the
source of cells should be clearly described, including the tis-
sue or organ of origin, ethnic and geographic origin, age, gen-
der, and general physiologic condition, as well as the health
or medical condition of the donor, if known. For animal cell
substrates, description of the source should include species,
strains, breeding conditions, tissue or organ of origin, geo-
graphic origin, age, gender, and general condition of the orig-
inal donor.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has licensed
live-virus vaccines, such as varicella and rubella, prepared
in diploid cell substrates (e.g., MRC-5, WI-38). Recently,Perspectives
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MRC-5 was used as a cell substrate for the preparation of an
experimental smallpox vaccine under a Phase 1 trial (9).
Another diploid cell strain, FrhL-2, has been used as a cell
substrate for rotavirus vaccine and other live-virus vaccines
tested in human clinical trials. The FDA experience in evalu-
ating live-virus vaccines prepared in these diploid cell sub-
strates makes the selection and use of such cell substrates
potentially suitable for manufacture of a smallpox vaccine.
The continuous cell line Vero has been used to prepare a
U.S.-licensed inactivated virus vaccine, the inactivated polio
vaccine. Although the FDA has not yet licensed a live-virus
vaccine manufactured in a continuous cell line, international
experience with Vero cells suggests that they may be a suit-
able substrate for a smallpox vaccine. Issues pertaining to
Vero cells as a substrate for live vaccines, including tumori-
genic potential, were discussed at the May 2000 Vaccines
and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee meet-
ing (35). Further information regarding cell substrates can
be obtained in the FDA document “Draft Points to Consider
in the Characterization of Cell Lines Used to Produce Biolog-
icals” (1993). An FDA letter to vaccine manufacturers con-
cerning the use of Vero cells was recently issued (http://
www.fda.gov/cber/letters.htm). 
Any new smallpox vaccine ideally should not be less
immunogenic than animal-derived vaccines. The properties
of Poxviridae host range, virulence, and genome composition
have been shown to change upon many passages in tissue
culture cells. To retain the properties that make VACV a
good vaccine against smallpox, the number of passages in
the cell culture substrate should be kept to a minimum.
LC16m8, an attenuated VACV strain developed by
Japan in 1975 for primary vaccination, was derived by pass-
ing the Lister strain 36 times through primary rabbit kidney
cells at low temperature (30°C) (36). The LC16m8 strain had
a take rate of 95% (compared with 93.7% for Lister), fever
rate of 7.7% (compared with 26.6% for Lister), and lower
neurovirulence in a monkey assay. The lower fever rate and
reduced neurovirulence were considered indications that
this was a safer vaccine (37). Antibody titers and induration
size were lower than those of the Lister strain; however, the
effect of its decreased immunogenicity on the ability of this
vaccine to protect against smallpox infection is unknown
since the vaccine was never used in a smallpox-endemic
region.
Similarly, the Modified  Vaccinia  Ankara was derived
from the Ankara  Vaccinia strain and is one of the most
highly attenuated strains. With >570 passages in chicken
embryo fibroblasts, it is host restricted and unable to repli-
cate in human and other mammalian cells. Pock lesions did
not form at the site of inoculation, and no adverse reactions
were observed in clinical trials in persons at high risk with
skin lesions (38). Modified Vaccinia Ankara was intended to
serve as an attenuated smallpox vaccine for primary vacci-
nations in regions where smallpox was not endemic, since
most of the adverse reactions associated with VACV occur
after primary vaccination. The vaccine was safely used to
vaccinate >120,000 persons in Turkey and Germany; how-
ever, its effectiveness against smallpox is unknown.
The cell substrate must be screened extensively for both
endogenous and exogenous viral contamination. The mea-
sures taken to remove, inactivate, or prevent contamination
of the product from any adventitious agent present in the
cell substrate should be described. When applicable,
carefully designed viral clearance studies should be con-
ducted with different methods of virus inactivation or
removal in the same production process to achieve maximum
viral clearance. In addition, studies should be performed to
assess virus inactivation and removal. The FDA has drafted
several documents that provide guidance concerning testing
biological products for adventitious agents (Appendix).
Clinical Trials
Phase 1
Phase 1 vaccine trials are primarily designed to evalu-
ate safety and immunogenicity in small groups (e.g., 10 to 20
persons) of closely monitored healthy adult volunteers. Clini-
cal evaluations of safety in Phase 1 studies should include
both local injection site (lesion measurement) and systemic
reactions, as well as hematologic testing, serum chemistries,
and other laboratory studies. At predefined intervals, peri-
odic assessments of the local injection site and systemic
signs and symptoms would normally be recorded. For live
attenuated VACV vaccines, active monitoring of the immuni-
zation site would be required for at least 21 days or until for-
mation and separation of the scab, whichever is longer.
One difficulty in evaluating a new smallpox vaccine is
demonstrating that the vaccine generates a protective
immune response in the recipient. The appearance of a vac-
cine take or lesion is thought to be an important correlate of
immunity. In Phase 1 trials, the frequency and size of the
lesion generated by a new vaccine should be compared with
the values observed historically for the current licensed calf
lymph-type vaccine. It is also important to compare the
breadth and scale of the hosts’ immune response with
responses generated by vaccines previously used against
smallpox infection. One of the challenges will be developing
validated assays to evaluate vaccine efficacy. In a Phase 1
trial, VACV-binding antibodies should be determined by
ELISA and plaque neutralization assays. Extensive charac-
terization of the immune response, including investigation of
the cellular as well as the humoral response, can be pursued
in Phase 2 studies.
Situations in prelicensure trials that may lead to safety
problems for both vaccinees and their close contacts need to
be anticipated. Contraindications for vaccinees include
immune disorders, HIV infection, eczema, history of eczema,
other skin conditions including burns, immunosuppressive
therapy, malignancies, lymphomas and leukemias, and preg-
nancy. Vaccinees who have close contacts with these con-
traindications should also be excluded. Mechanisms to
address rare serious VACV vaccine complications (e.g., avail-
ability of VACV immunoglobulin treatment) need to be
addressed in the protocol.
For live attenuated VACV products, sponsors should
describe their proposed procedures for containing the live
biological material during their clinical studies and should
provide data on the expected survival of the organism in the
environment. Shedding of live vaccine organisms would need
to be evaluated; isolation of volunteers early in clinical devel-
opment may be necessary to assess the shedding of VACV
and the potential for spread to contacts. The vaccination site
needs to be covered at all times with a porous bandage until
the scab has separated and the underlying skin has healed.Perspectives
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A dry, porous bandage is preferred to prevent the
accumulation of perspiration around the inoculation site,
which can increase the risk for secondary inoculation (9).
Subjects should receive a dressing kit, including a medical
waste bag in case the dressing should come off. Subjects and
health-care professionals who may handle these dressings
should be instructed on the importance of handwashing after
contact with the site to prevent both self-inoculation of the
virus and contact with the site by unvaccinated persons.
Phase 2
In Phase 2 studies, generally more subjects are enrolled
than in Phase 1 studies, and further data are provided on
safety and immunogenicity. Phase 2 vaccine studies are
often randomized and well controlled in design. One purpose
of Phase 2 studies is to identify a preferred vaccine formula-
tion, dose, and schedule for further clinical development in
definitive safety and efficacy trials. 
Clinical studies to compare the new vaccine with the
licensed Dryvax vaccine would be done at this phase. Study
size for a pivotal immunogenicity study would be based on
statistical design to provide enough power to detect differ-
ences in “vaccine take,” immune response, and safety (com-
mon local reactions) after inoculation by scarification,
compared with the licensed Wyeth Dryvax. Both the
humoral and cellular arms of the host response should be
measured.
Studies to validate immune response assays should
begin early in the drug development process. The goal is to
have validated assays in place to assess critical immune
responses before pivotal immunogenicity studies are initi-
ated (39). At a minimum, seroconversion would have to be
determined by plaque neutralization assays, VACV binding
antibodies by ELISA, and cellular responses by cytotoxic T-
lymphocyte response and lymphoproliferation assays. 
Phase 3 and Beyond
Conducting large-scale clinical endpoint efficacy field
trials for a new smallpox vaccine cannot be planned at this
time, in part because there are no longer any populations at
risk for naturally occurring smallpox infection. For new vac-
cines based on vaccine take rate and the development of neu-
tralizing antibody responses, pivotal comparative
immunogenicity studies of the new compared with the
licensed vaccines will likely form the basis of efficacy assess-
ment. Studies in humans to evaluate the ability of a vaccine
to protect against subsequent challenge with a live attenu-
ated VACV vaccine might also be informative.
Large-scale trials are needed to provide safety data to
support the license application, especially to evaluate less
common serious adverse events. Randomized, well-con-
trolled trials would provide the most informative safety data.
Plans should be defined for obtaining adequate safety
data. Pediatric use could be critical during a bioterrorist
event; however, identifying an appropriate pediatric study
population for safety and immunogenicity evaluation pre-
sents challenges. Plans for pediatric clinical development
should be discussed with the FDA (40,41). Finally, given the
historical information on adverse events associated with
VACV vaccination, a rigorous Phase 4 study commitment is
expected (42).
VACV Immunoglobulin Development
VACV immunoglobulin (VIG) is the only approved prod-
uct currently available for treating complications of VACV
vaccination. It is derived from the immunoglobulin fraction
of plasma from persons who were immunized with VACV.
The Red Cross initially obtained the product from the sera of
hyperimmunized army recruits. The current supply of VIG is
owned by the Department of Defense, which has provided
some of this material to CDC for release in response to emer-
gencies. VIG can be obtained from CDC to treat adverse
reactions of VACV vaccine recipients, such as laboratory
workers exposed to VACV or related Orthopoxviridae. 
VIG is believed to be effective against certain complica-
tions of VACV vaccinations; it is recommended by the CDC’s
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices for use in
treating eczema vaccinatum, vaccinia necrosum, severe gen-
eralized VACV infections, VACV infections of the eyes (but
not keratitis) or mouth, and VACV infections in the presence
of other skin lesions such as burns, impetigo, varicella
zoster, or poison ivy (43). No randomized controlled clinical
trials have been performed to evaluate therapeutic efficacy
in patients with VACV complications. However, a standard
of care has developed based on data consisting of case series
and anecdotal reports, as well as controlled data suggesting
that VIG may modify VACV infection if administered con-
comitantly with vaccine.
Limited data from unblinded controlled studies support
the efficacy of VIG in certain situations. In a trial conducted
in Madras, India, 705 family contacts of 208 smallpox
patients were randomized to receive smallpox vaccine or
smallpox vaccine plus VIG as soon as possible after the index
patient was admitted to the hospital. Smallpox developed in
5 of 326 contacts who received VIG compared with 21 of 379
controls, for a relative efficacy of 70% in preventing natural
smallpox (44) (p<0.05, calculated by the first author).
The potential for VIG to prevent postvaccine encephali-
tis when administered prophylactically with vaccine was
studied among Dutch military recruits in a double-blinded,
randomized, placebo-controlled trial (45). More than 106,000
recruits were randomized to receive VIG plus smallpox vac-
cine or placebo plus smallpox vaccine. Three cases of VACV-
associated encephalitis occurred in the VIG group compared
with 13 cases of encephalitis in the placebo group (p<0.05,
calculated by author).
Published case series of patients with severe VACV vac-
cination complications treated with VIG suggest that VIG
lowered case-fatality rates and shortened the course of dis-
ease (20,46-52). Other trials have used antiviral agents in an
attempt to treat complications (52-54), and these agents did
not appear to have greater benefit than VIG. VIG is not con-
sidered to be effective in treating postvaccine encephalitis
and is contraindicated for the treatment of vaccinal
keratitis(55).
The recommended therapeutic dosage of VIG is 0.6 mL/
kg intramuscularly, or 42 mL for a 70-kg adult; this dosage
may be repeated as often as weekly. Such high intramuscu-
lar volume can be associated with trauma and possible nerve
damage. Future development of VIG may include intrave-
nous formulations to obviate these dose-related problems. 
A more basic problem for the use of VIG is the availabil-
ity of licensed product. The amount of VIG needed to respondPerspectives
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to the adverse events associated with a large-scale
vaccination program cannot be manufactured from the cur-
rently available human sera.
Future Considerations
An important benefit of the eradication of naturally
occurring smallpox was the cessation of smallpox vaccina-
tion and the elimination of iatrogenic VACV vaccine adverse
events. Growing concern about the U.S. population’s vulner-
ability to a potential terrorist attack with biological weapons
has led to strong political commitment to develop and stock-
pile new vaccines and other agents to respond to such an
event (56). This response requires the development and
manufacture of an effective vaccine, as well as products to
treat the potential complications arising from a widespread
vaccination program.
The evaluation of these products, especially ones that do
not induce a vaccine take and induce an immune response
that substantially differs from that induced by the currently
licensed vaccine, may pose problems. Specifically, the usual
measures of efficacy that require exposure to natural disease
currently are not possible because the disease has been glo-
bally eradicated. In addition, definitive human challenge
and protection studies with Variola would not be possible for
ethical reasons.
In general, the issue of providing substantial evidence of
efficacy when the traditional efficacy studies in humans can-
not be done is of concern to the FDA. To address this issue,
FDA has published and requested comments on a proposed
rule intended to address certain efficacy issues for new
agents to be used against lethal or permanently disabling
toxic substances (57). The proposed rule attempts to define
standards so that new drug and biological products devel-
oped to prevent serious or life-threatening conditions could
be approved for marketing on the basis of evidence of effec-
tiveness derived from appropriate studies in animals, with-
out adequate and well-controlled efficacy studies in humans
(21 CFR 314.126). For example, the wide host range of poxvi-
rus viruses could potentially lead to the exploration of a
monkeypox model to obtain supporting data. For vaccines,
human safety and immunogenicity data would also be
needed to support such approvals. The final rule, when pub-
lished, would be expected to facilitate the development and
licensing of certain new products to protect against biological
warfare. This proposal would not apply if approval can be
based on other standards in FDA regulations.
The future response to complications inherent in a new
smallpox vaccine during a wide-scale vaccination program
could entail a combination approach including VIG, antiviral
drugs, and immune-based therapy involving humanized
antibodies or fragments of antibodies produced in animals.
Antiviral medications could be mass-produced, stored for
long periods of time, and distributed quickly, if needed. Cido-
fovir, a DNA polymerase inhibitor developed for Cytomega-
lovirus retinitis, has been found to be active in preventing
Variola infection in cultured cells and protects mice against
lethal VACV challenge (58,59). In the long term, more
products should be developed to protect the general
population against adverse events due to VACV infection.
Each product will pose unique scientific issues for evaluation
and licensure.
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Appendix
A. Examples of U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Interna-
tional Conference on Harmonization (ICH) Documents Relevant to
the Manufacture and Product Quality of New Smallpox Vaccines 
To obtain these documents, connect to http://www.fda.gov/cber/
guidelines.htm or call the FDA Office of Communication, Training
and Manufacturers Assistance at 1-800-835-4709.)
B. Examples of ICH Documents Relevant to Clinical Testing 
of Vaccines
To obtain these documents, connect to http://www.fda.gov/cber/
guidelines.htm or call the FDA Office of Communication, Training
and Manufacturers Assistance at 1-800-835-4709.
Title Date
FDA points to consider in the characterization of cell 
lines used to produce biologicals
1993
ICH guidance on quality of biotechnological/biological 
products: derivation and characterization of cell 
substrates used for production of biotechnological/ 
biological products
1998
ICH guidance on viral safety evaluation of biotechnology 
products derived from cell lines of human or animal 
origin
1998
FDA guidance for industry: content and format of 
chemistry, manufacturing and controls information and 
establishment description information for a vaccine or 
related product
1999
FDA draft guidance for industry: revised preventive 
measures to reduce the possible risk of transmission of 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and Variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) by blood and blood 
products
2001
Title Date
Good clinical practice: Consolidated guideline 1997
General considerations for clinical trials 1997
Structure and content of clinical study reports 1996
Statistical principles for clinical trials (draft) 1997Perspectives
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C. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and U.S. Pharmacopeia
(USP) Standards Applicable to Vaccines
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